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ABSTRACT
Thevast literature on human capital and earnings assumes
that individuals know in advance that they willcomplete a
particular program of schooling. This paper treats educationas
a sequential choice that is made under uncertainty. Asimple two
period structural model is used to explore the effects of
ability, high school preparation, preferences forschooling, the
borrowing rate, and ex post payoffs to college on theprobability
of various post secondary college outcomes and theex ante return
to starting college. The model provides the basis fora simple
empirical method of accounting for uncertainty about educational
outcomes and for nonlinearity in the relationship betweenyears
of education and earnings when estimating theexpected return to
the first year of college. I present estimates of theeffects of
gender, aptitude, high school curriculum, family background







NBERI. Introduction and Suary
Most of the enormous empirical literature on human capital andearnings
that has grown out of the wot-k of Jacob Mincer (1958. 1962. 1974), Becker
(1975), and other pioneers of the human capital approach to income distribution
and earnings abstracts from uncertainty about whether a program ofschooling will
be completed. An individual chooses the education level that maximizes the
present discounted value of wealth given her borrowing rate and the effect of
education on earnings, completes her education, and receives the expected return
in the market place associated with the chosen schooling level. A rich
literature on the returns to education attempts to account for various biases
that may arise If education choices are systematically related to other factors
(such as aptitude) that influence earnings.'But this literature also views the
individual as able to choose a future level of education with no uncertainty
about actually completing the level. Furthermore, most of the literatureon
returns to education does not address the fact that there are large differences
in earnings by field of study or the fact that choice of college major often
changes during college.2
This paper examines some implications of the view that educational
decisions are made under uncertainty. I analyze a simple structural model of
education choice and implement a method for accounting for uncertainty about
educational outcomes and for nonlinearity in the relationship betweenyears of
education and earnings when estimating the expected return to ayear of school.
I provide estimates of the effects of aptitude, high school curriculum, and
family background characteristics and other variables on the expected return.
The work is motivated by three facts that suggest that uncertaintymay
have important consequences for the demand for education and for measurement of
the returns to education. First, many individuals attend but never finish
college even though they report that they plan to complete college or graduate
work at the time that they begin college. In the National LongitudinalSurvey of
See for example, CrUtches (1977), Willis and Rosen (1978), and the
surveys by Rosen (1978) and Willis (1986).
2 Among the recent studies that doexamine differences in earnings by
college major are Berger (1987), and Paglin and Ruffolo (1990), Brown and
Corcoran (1990), and Bamberger (1986). As noted below, Bamberger's model of
choice of major explicitly takes into account the fact that individuals who
start college in a particular major may switch to another major or drop out of school.2
theHighSchool Classof1972(NLS12) sample, 89 percent of high schoolseniors
whoplanto complete college or graduate schoolstart college but only 58.1 have
completed college by l919. Compariso,s ofplans with actual majors indicate
that individuals are also quiteuncertain about what they will major Induring
college.
Second,for some demographic groups thereturns toeducation are
nonlinear, with much of the return associated with
completing high school or
completing college. For young men I find thatattending college for less than
two years or for 2 or more
years but not receiving a degree changes the logwage by -.0076and .057 respectively, whileobtaining a degree raises the logwage by
.179. Nonhlnearities are much lessimportant for women in the NLS72 and
undoubtedly vary across time.4 However, thegeneral point is that nonhinearities
in the returns may produce substantialdifferences between ex ante and expost
returns to the first year or two of college.
As Weisbrod (1962) pointed out, the
return to the first year of college is not theearnings differential between
individuals with12and 13 years ofschooling who are the same in other
dimensionsthat affect earnings. Rather, thereturn is the difference between
the earnings of the person whostops at 12 and the expected earnings net of
education costs of a person who attends the
first year of college, where the
expectation is taken across earnings associated
with 14 years, 15 years, 16years
and higher education levels weightedby the probability that the individual who
has completed year 13 will
successfully complete those higher levels. The
coefficientson years of education and on interaction
terms involving years of
education and school or backgroundcharacteristics in a conventionalearnings
regression may provide misleading estimates of both(1) the value cx anteof the
additional year of schooling and (2) theeffect of school characteristics and
high school curriculum on that value. Thisis because such regressions
condition on the ultimate educational
outcome, which is uncertain at the time
This result is for a sample of 9,032 forwhom valid data on educational attairunent in 1979 and educational plans
as of senior year of high school are available. The small fraction doesnot appear to reflect unreliability of the
responses to the question about education
plans: 93.5 percent of the people who obtained a college or graduatedegree indicated in 1972 that they plannedto obtain a college or graduatedegree.
'.Manystudies find evidence of acollege diploma effect or of higher returnsto the latter years of college thanto the early years. See for example, Hungerford and Solon (1987) and CardandKrueger (1990, Figure 2).3
that the decision about whether to pursue an additional year of schooling 1.
made.Variables that affect the probability that an individual will actually
complete the program may play en important role in the decision to start college.
Third, there are large differences across fields of specialization in the
earnings differential between college and high school graduates. The estimates
in Table 1 indicate, for example, that engineers receive high returns in the
labor market. The differences across fields are reflected in surveys of the
salaries of college graduates and in studies using other micro data sets.5
Specificity of the knowledge acquired in particular fields of study, such as
mathematics or English. end the importance of pre-requisites in some fields,
particularly mathematics and the sciences, may mean that course selections in
high school or the early years of college condition the options available later
in much the same way that occupation specific on the job training conditions
future employment options.6 Decisions to change fields because of new
information about preferences for particularly types of work and study or poor
performance, or other factors may be very costly. As Bamberger (1986) points
out, to the extent that individuals are uncertain about the probability that they
will be able to and will want to complete a program in a particular field, they
must take into account the alternative options that starting a particular program
of study might lead to.
There are a few studies in addition to those mentioned above that have
examined the implications of uncertainty about education outcomes. Manski
(1989) usesseries of models of education as a sequential decision to analyze
the properties of policies designed to reduce the drop out rate from post
See Berger (1988). who uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor
Market Experience Youth Cohort. Paglin and Ruffolo (1990) cite several surveys
of starting salaries of college graduates. They find a strong relationship
between the salaries in different fields and the average Math GRE scores of
persons who took the GRE and majored in the field. They attribute much of the
difference in wages across fields to the market returns to the math aptitude of
those who go into the various fields, but do not examine whether the returns to
math and verbal aptitude depend upon the major one graduates in. The present
paper does not focus on the sources of the differences in returns across fields,
but it is worth noting that the estimates below indicate that there are large
differences in the cx post payoffs to various majors even after one conditions on
the aptitude and achievement scores and other high school and family background
variables.
6 See Shaw (1987) and Sichermanand Galor's (1990) discussion of
occupations.4
secondary school.7 Similar ideas arise the
occupational choice models of Miller
(1984) and Shaw (1987). Ranburger
(1986) explicitly accounts for the factthat
individuals must take account of the
probabilities of having to switchmajors or drop out of school and the
resulting payoffs when they consider thepresent value
of future earnings associatedwith an initial choice ofmajor. He formulates and
estimates a model of the choice of
major in which students base decisionsabout
major on both the expected returns if
they successfully complete themajor and
the probability that they willdo so given past educationalchoices and outcomes.
However, the theoretical and empirical
literature treating educationas a
sequential decision under
uncertainty is very limited, anduncertainty about
completing school has been ignored in
empirical studies of the returns to
education.
Section II provides a simple 2period structural model thatcaptures most
aspects of the schooling decision problem
mentioned above. I use to the modelto
illustrate the effects of
aptitude, high school preparation,tastes for
schooling, and the cx post returns to
various college degrees on theex ante
internal rate of return to
starting college and on the probabilities ofvarious
post secondary outcomes.
Section [II presents an
empirically estimable reduced form versionof an
equation for the cx ante rate of
return to starting college presented insection
II. An implication of the
structural model in section 2 is thatprior to
choosing whether to start college each
individual faces a set of probabilities
that she will ultimately
complete a particular level of educationin a particular
field conditional upon
starting college. There is also a set ofmarket payoffs
to completing an education
program of a particular length in aparticular field.
Personal characteristics affectthe expected rate of return to
starting college both by altering the marketpayoffs associated with completingparticular
postsecondary programs of study and by
altering the probabilities that the
individual will complete theprograms.
In Section IV I discuss the data
and the specificajns of reducedform
equations for the Probability (conditional
upon starting college) of 18
education outcomes.I also discuss the variablesthat are included in thewage equation that is used to estimate the
ex post payoffs to various education
outcomesSection V presents estimates of
the expected internal rate ofreturn
7. See alsoComay et al (1973).5
to starting college for various groups. In section VI I discuss the sensitivity
of the results to treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in the payoffs to various
education outcomes and to assumptions about the information set available to high
school seniors.
The main empirical results are as follows. First, the ex ante return to
starting college evaluated at the sample mean for male high school graduates is
2.8 percent in the base case considered below, while the cx post return is
actually slightly negative.8 The cx post and cx ante returns for female high
school graduates are closer ((8.5) versus (7.4)), and are much larger than the
return for men. The cx ante returns for both men and women are substantially
higher if one allows the cx post payoff to education to increase with labor
market experience.
Second, the differences between men and women in the cx post payoffs to
various post secondary outcomes explain most of the gender difference in
returns. (Women who do not attend college earn much less than comparable men.)
Differences in the characteristics of men and women do not make much difference.
However, gender differences in the equations for education outcomes tend to raise
the return to college for men relative to women.
Third, high aptitude individuals have a substantially higher cx ante
return to starting college than low aptitude individuals. Aptitude raises the
return for men both by increasing the cx post payoffs to college and by
favorably altering the probabilities of the various education outcomes
conditional on starting college. For women the link between aptitude and the cx
ante return to education is dominated by the effect of aptitude on the cx post
payoffs to college.
Fourth, an academic high school curriculum and a favorable family
background raises the cx ante returns in the case of young men but makes only a
small difference for young women.
Fifth, those who start college are estimated to have a substantially
higher cx ante internal rate of return to doing so than those who do not.
In section VII I close the paper with a research agenda.
II. Education as a Sequential Choice
This section uses a simple two period model of education choice under
8 The estimate of 2.8 refers to the basecase En which the returns to
education do not depend upon labor market experience. I report estimates 4.1 and
7.3 under alternative assumptions about the size of the interactions.6
uncertainly to flesh out some of the ideas in the
introduction and to providea
theoretical foundation for the reduced form
equations for education outcosused
in the empirical analysis of ex antereturns to education. In section ii.iI set
up the model. In Section 11.2 and Appendix 1 and2 1 discuss comparativestatics
concerning the value of starting college, the
ex ante Probability of various
education outcomes, and the ex ante internalrate of return to starting
college. 11.1 The Model
In period 0 an individual decides
whether to work or to begincollege in
either math/science or the humanities.
The field of study influences themix of
science and humanities courses taken.
Knowledge in math/science and humanities
at the end of a year of college
depends upon the field chosen,aptitude, the
stock of knowledge at the start ofthe year, and an error vector.The monetary
return to the second year of college is
degree specific and is 0 if the
individual does not attain the minimum
(field specific) knowledgerequirements
for a degree in either field.
Furthermore, a person who attendscollege
discovers whether she dislikes
college relative to working and her relative
preferences for math/science and thehumanities. At the end of the firstperiod
a student may change her field ofstudy or drop out of school. Her decision
reflects new information about
preferences, the probability that she willbe able
to complete a degree in math/science
or humanities given her stock ofknowledge after the first year of college,
and the payoffs associated with thedifferent
education outcomes. If she attends
school a second year. she findsout whether
she completed degree requirementsat the end of the year. She thengoes to work
at the appropriate wage.
I now turn to the details of the
model. I first discuss the stock of
knowledge, ability, and fields ofstudy and then earnings and preferences.
The Stock of KnowJeg In
primary school, secondary school, and
POstsecondary school individuals acquire
knowledge in field m and field h. Let
knowledge at the end of schoolyear s be denoted by K
,K—(K ,IC.), where K S$ ms ns ma is math and science knowledge,
is humanities/social sciencesknowledge at the end of s, and s —0,1, and 2 refer to high school, the
first year of college, and the second (final)
year of college respectively.
jjj At the end of high school
individuals differ in two dimensions
of cognitive ability thathave value in human capitalinvestment and in
production. Let
A_(Aa A.) where Am is math/science ability andA. is verbal
ability. Presumably A is moreimportant for the production of andA.
is7
more important for the production of K..
Fields of Study: A poatsecondary school program is a field specific
function relating K41 to K, A, and a stochastic component. The field of study
in year a is denoted by c5, c—ia or h. Field m is math, science and engineering.
Field h denotes humanities and social sciences. The distribution of K+i is
stochastically increasing in K5 and in A regardless of what field is chosen.
A specific example of such a function is
(1)K —H K +w A+c
s+lca S CS a
The matrices Hf and irf capture the fact that the particular courses
associated with a field of study influence the evolution of knowledge. The
first term in the equation captures the idea that K5+1 will depend not only on
the program of study but also on what one already knows. In fields in which
prerequisites are important, such as math and science, one would expect c5 to
place a large weight on the component of K5 that is a major part of the field.
The second term in the equation captures the idea that math and verbal ability
will, influence how much an individual learns from a given program of study. The
error vector captures the influence of particular teachers and courses and
unforcastable individual specific shocks (such as Illness, emotional problems)
that affect how much the student learns in the year.9 The aptitudes Am and An
are fixed and known to the student when s—0, so LaffectsK but not A.
Degree Reoutrements: A college degree in field h or in m requires that a
field specific function of knowledge K2m K2h exceed a threshold degree
requirement. The level of K (K.) is presumably more important in field m (h)
than in field h (m). Given that the links between K0 and and between and
are stochastic, there is uncertainty about whether an individual who sets out
to complete a degree in field c will succeed. The probability that a person
who is studying in field c in the second year will complete the degree
requirements depends upon Kib. A, and A according to
(2a) g2 —02(1(1,1(lh' Am• Ab)
(2b) —02hl
'1(lh'Am Ah),
where both functions are strictly increasing in all arguments. The graduation
One would not expect c to enter additively or to be independent of field.8
probabilities g2 and have a distribution conditional on A, and the
choice of field in the first year of school. (This is
because K1 is random). Let
F(g2g2 K0, A. c1) be the joint distribution function ofg2 and and
let F(g2 I K, A, c1) be the marginal distributionof assume that both
joint distribution and marginal distribution have amonotone likelihood ratio
property in the elements of K0 and A. In the bivariate case thismeans that
dFh(xl, x2Ks', A', cl)/dFh(xl, x2 ICo",A", c1),
is strictly increasing in bothx1 and x2 over the range of and g2 if
A') >O"'A"), where dFh is the density corresponding toF. The
monotone likelihood ratio property implies first orderstochastic dominance.
I assume that the programs of study and therequirements for field m and
field h are sufficiently different that studentswho choose to study in field a
(h) in the second period have a negligible chance of
completing the degree
requirements in h (a).1°
Earnings: The discounted present value of earnings isY0 for persons who
enter the labor market after high school, —Y(l
+r1)/(l
+R)for
individuals who leave school after 1year of college, Y1/(l +R)for persons who
attend college a second year but fail toget a degree, Y2 —Y0(1
+r)(l
+R)2
for persons with a math/science degree, and2h —Y0(1+r2h)(l.
+R) for
persons with a humanities degree. R is the discount rate.I assume
'2m' '2h >'l
'
Theseinequalities guarantee that persons who are indifferentbetween
school and work will choose to complete
college if they are certain of being
able to meet the requirements. I
assume the experience profile of wages is
independent of years in school and field of study)I also assume here that no
10 This
assumption is a statement about the values of theparameters of the
knowledge accumulation equation function,including the degree of randomness,
about the levels of degree requirements in themath/science and in humanities.
One may regard the earningsparameters r1, r,.,,, and r, as conditional on A and K0. The comparative statics
results reported below for A and K0 below hold the earnings
parameters constant while varying A and K0. This
focuses attention on the fact that thesevariables influence the value or
starting college and the cx ante rate of returneven if they do not affect the cx post payoffs to education. Onemay easily calculate the total effects of A and
K0 byallowingthe earnings parameters tovary with them. See also the
discussion in footnote 33. In theempirical work I allow the link between
education and earnings to depend onability and experience. One might also wish
to allow earnings to depend in amore continuous way on the stock of knowledge9
new information about Y ,Y ,andY arrives until education decisions are 2w2h 1
made. In Appendix 3 I analyze a variant of the model in which new information
about 2 and 2h arrives after the first year of college, and the empirical
analysis below allows for the possibility of new information.
Preferences: Utility depends on the present value of income, a taste
parameter j summarizing nonpecuniary preferences for education program and the
job types it leads to, and the type of job and education program an individual
chooses. There are three types of people, with j —0,1, and 2. Type 0 people
dislike the school and white collar jobs sufficiently that they receive a minimal
increase in utility to completing a degree even though they would earn higher
wages if they complete college and take a white collar job.
Type I people are indifferent between spending time at work or at school
in the humanities. They are also indifferent between jobs that do and do not
require postsecondary education. However, type 1 individuals hate spending time
in field ininschool or on the job. Their dislike is sufficiently large relative
to Y -Yand Y -Ythat they never choose field ininyear 2. 2m 2h 2w 1
Type 2 individuals are indifferent between the type of jobs and between
time spent in school and at work.
At the end of high school the probability that a given individual with
characteristics X is type j is equal toe(X) where j—l, 2, or 3.Individuals
learn their preferences after the first year college.12
11.2 The Return to College and the Probability of Completing College
I now use the model to examine the effects of various factors on the
rather than simply upon the thresholds for a degree. This would complicate the
theoretical analysis because one would not be able to summarize the effect of
K1 and A on V, as operating throughg2. As noted in the conclusion, one
could modity the empirical analysis of ex ante rates of return to allow earnings
to depend upon grades and courses using data from postsecondary school
transcripts.
12• I am assuming that all individuals have nononpecuniery preference
between spending a year working, spending the first year of college In math, and
spending the first year of college in humanities. This could easily be relaxed.
To keep the dynamic program problem simple I have ruled out the possibility that
those who choose not to go to college because they think they are type 0
individuals revise their prior beliefs and then choose to attend school. There
are no conceptual difficulties in relaxing this assumption. One might also wish
to assume that the new information about preferences that an individual acquires
depends upon the field that he tries, as in the matching models such as Miller
(1984). This would dramatically complicate the decision problem because the
choice of field also conditions accumulation of K.10
value of starting college, the probability of variouseducation outcomes
conditional on starting college, and the ex antereturn to starting college.
At the end of period of 0 the individual must choosebetween going to
work, attending the first year of college in fieldis, and attending the first
year of college in field h. The value of going to work issimply Y0. The value
of attending the first year of college in fieldm or field h is
2
(3)V1(K0, A ,0,is1) _eE(V2(g2, j)K0,A.m1)
(4)V1(K0, A0, h1) 81 E(V2(g2, j)IK0.A,h1
where the expectation E is taken over the
distribution F(g2I I(o, A,c1) of
conditional on K0, A, and the choice of fieldc in the first period and
V2(g2, j)
is the value having attended school for 1year and obtained graduation
probabilities g2 for a person who is type
Type 0 persons drop out school and receiveY1, so
(5)V2(g2, 0) —Y1.
For type 1 individuals (who hate is),the value function is the max of the
return to staying in college and studying humanitiesand leaving school and
receiving Y:
(6)V2(g2, 1) —Max(Ig22h + (1 -2)Y1/(l +R)J,Y1)
Type 2 individuals either stay in school andmajor in h, stay in school
and major in is, or drop out and receiveY1, so
(7)V2(g2, 2)— Max t2h T2h + [1 - Y1/(l + R)J,
Y2 + l-gJ Y,/(1 + R), Y1).
An individual starts college if
(8) llax(V1(K0, A ,8(X),h1), V1(K0, A, 0(X), II) > Y0.
A person starts college in field h if(8) holds and in addition
13 Keep inmind that g —(g ,g2I is determined by K1 and A in
accordance with equations (2 and ) an thatFh is determined by the equation of motion for knowledge andgraduation requirements.11
(9) V1(K0, A ,8(X),h1) >V1(K0,A, 8(X),
In proposition 1 I summarizea few propertiesof the value of starting
college. (See Appendix 1 for proofs.)
Proposition 1: The value of starting college relative to is increasing in
A, 021(01 +02), '2h"10'and 2m"1'Oand decreasing in 80 and R.
The intuition for these results is simple.I(o and A shift out the
distribution of the probability that the individual will be able to satisfy
graduation requirements in math, science, or both. An increase in the cx post
payoffs to the completing 1 year of college (Y1) and to completing two years of
college with a degree in math or humanities also raises the value of
starting college. 00 raises the dropout probability, lowering the return. An
Increase in 82/(01 +°2(holding 80 constant) raises the odds that a math degree
will be a viable option in the second period. This raises the return to starting
college. An increase in the discount rate R lowers the return to starting
college even when "/o' 2h"O' and ''2m"0 are held constant because it lowers
the present value of earnings associated with attending college a second year but
failing to graduate. Of course, most of the negative effect of R on the value of
starting college Is due to the fact that an increase in R lowers Y1/Y0, Y2h/YO.
and
Due to space limitations, I do not analyze in detail the determinants of
the value of starting college in m relative to h. The relative value depends In
part upon how the field in year 1 and the relative values of Kob, Køm A. and Am
influence the distribution of K1 and as a consequence the distribution Fh of
and g2 in year 2. The return to isrelativeto h is a negative function 81/(81 +
82)and is likely to be a negative function of 2h"12m' KOh/KO and Am/Am•
Finally, it is interesting to note that sensitivity of the value of
college to knowledge and ability depends upon preferences. The variables and
A are relevant to the decision to start college because they increase the
probability that the individual could actually meet graduation requirements if
she were to choose to try. However, the expected value of the option is
diminished if the individual believes that she will turn out to be type 0 and
will choose to drop out anyway. if 80 is close to 1, then individual does not
expect to complete college, and the contribution of I( or A to the knowledge
accumulation process in college is of little value.
Education Outcome Probabilities end the Ex Ante Return to Starting Collep.e
The internal rate of return to starting college in field c is the12
value of p that solves
(10) 1 —Plc1.(1 +r1)/(l+p+ (1+
+ Plc2hU+r2h)/(l+p)+(P12)(l+
where
1'lcl —probabilityof leaving college after the firstyear
2 —probabilityof spending 2 years in college butfatling to complete C
degree
lc2h —probabilityof completing a degree in humanities
—probabilityof completing a degree in math
c —hor a.
In general, the cx ante internal rate of
return to starting college is
different from the cx post return to the firstyear. In particular, even
r1 —0,the ex ante internal rate of return to
starting college is positive
provided that r2h and r2 are positive and there issome possibility of
completing college.
In appendix 2 I derive expressions forthe education outcome
probabilities as a function of 8,
A, 'Yo Yi '2m and 2h' and the interest
rateusedto discount earnings. I summarize a fewproperties of these
probabilities in the following propositions.
(See Appendix 2 for proofs.)
Proposition 3a. The probability
p11 of dropping out of college after one year
La a positive function of
r1 and 0. It is a negative function of 02/(61 +
r2h,r2, K0, A, and 1/(1 +R).
The taste probability
0 increases P11 because it increases the odds
that the person will find out that she
dislikes college and dislikes thetypes of
jobs that reward a college degree and thusdecide to drop out.82/(81 +°2is
the conditional probability that theperson can accept both engineering and
humanities, rather than simply humanities.
The possibility of majoring in
either humanities or mathematics raises
the expected value of attemptingcollege. The higher
r2h and r2 (holding r1 constant) and the lower R, the lower the
critical value
g2 (the pass probability) for the individual to remain incollege
after the first year. Increases in1(0 and A increase the probability that
will be high enough to warrant
staying in college, lowering the dropout rate
after the first year.
Proposition 3b. The probability
1'1c2. of attending college for a second year and13
fatling to get a degree is negatively related to 00 and r1. The effects of
A, Oi/(Oi +02)are ambiguous. r2m has a positive effect when r2 > r2h. r2
and rhave a positive effect when r —r
2h 2m 2h
The negative effect of 80 on lc2 is obvious given that all type 0
individuals leave school after 1 year. The ambiguity underlying K0 and A is
interesting. Increases in these variables shift out the distribution of the
vector of graduation probabilities g2. This shift increases the likelihood
that the realization of or will be large enough to justify attending
college for a second year. This will tend to increase lc2 •assumingthat the
probability of graduating conditional on attending the second year is unchanged.
However, the shift will also increase the conditional graduation probability.
This will lower P
1c2.
The ambiguity in the effect of 02/(81 + 02) is also interesting. As
noted in proposition 3a, the probability of dropping out after the first year is
negatively related to 02/(81 +02).which means that the fraction of students who
attend a second year of college rises. This will tend to increase as well
as P and P .Furthermoreif r > r some individuals who would have lc2m lc2h 2m 2h
chosen humanities if they were type 1 will choose math even though <
This will tend to lower the probability of completing degree requirements
conditional on attempting the second year and raise P12 as well. On the other
hand, the distribution of the maximum of g2 and stochastically dominates the
distribution of and this will tend to increase the conditional graduation
probability for type 2 individuals relative to type 1 individuals.14The
intuition here is that individuals who are only marginal in the humanities but
are very good at math/science will have a higher graduation probability if their
preferences are such that math/science is a viable option.
Proposition 3.c The graduation probability lc2h +1'lc2mis decreasing in 80, (1
+R),andr1. It is increasing in r2h if r2hr2 and is increasing in r2m if
r > r .Itis increasing in rand rholding r -rconstant. If 2m 2h 2h 2m 2h 2m
r2mr2h. the graduation probability is increasing in K0, A, and 02/(81 +02).
The effect of 8, (I +R),r2 and r2h are obvious. An increase in r2h
or r2 will lower by raising the ex post payoff to those who complete
college. However, the effect of r on P +P is ambiguous without 2h lc2h lc2m
further assumptions because the increase may lure students with high g to take
14 Ifr2 —r •theconditional graduation probability is definitely
higher for type 2 lan for type 1 individuals.14
a chance on graduating in humanities, raising the failurerate. The possibility
can be ruled out if r1 <r2,in which case students choose humanitiesover math
only if >g2.The same argument applies to
r2m.
Increases in Ko, A,and
02/(618) lower P11•• However, they could
lower the graduation probability byincreasing the fraction of type2
individuals who opt for the high risk,high return major. This possibility is
ruled out if r2ffi_r2h. Below I find thatincreases in and A (as measured high
school courses, grades, and tests) increasethe graduation probability.15
Comparative Statics Analysis of the ExoectedInternal Rate of Return
One can analyze the effects ofability, preferences, and the ex post
payoffs to college by substituting the
equations (A2.2), (A2.3), (A2.4) and
(A2.5) into (10) and performing comparative
statics. The comparative statics
relating the p to P ,P ,P ,P
,rand rand r c lcl. 1c2. lc2hlc2m 2h 2m 1 are
straightforward. Given the assumption2m '''2h> ''l'c is negatively related
to P11• holding P12 and
1'lc2h"1c2m constant, negatively related to
lc2. holding 1c2h"lc2m Constant, andpositively related to lc2m"lclh holding
1c2m +l2hconstant. is increasing in the ex post returnsto college.
The analysis of the effects of thefundamental variables A,
r2h. r2,
r1, and 8 is complicated because they influence all of theprobabilities. It is
tedious to work through the
comparative statics analytically. It iseasy to do
so numerically, and I do so below.
In the present case, however, thespecial assumptions made about
preferences have the implication that theinternal rate of return tostarting
It should be keeping with the
empirical emphasis in the paper on thecx ante return to education, Propositions
3.a, 3.b and 3.c characterjse how a number of factors influence on theprobability of various postsecondary education
outcomes conditional on starting
college. However, by considering A, 6, to have a distribution in the
population, one may use the model toanalyse the determinants of the probability of
obtaining a college degree in humanities, in math without Conditioning
on starting college. The implicationsmay be quite different from a perfect foresight
model. For example, with sequentionalchoice under uncertainty, increases in
r2 can actually increase the probability that a high school graduate will endup wth a degree in engineering provided that +62)is not very large and that thereis limited specialization in the fIrst year of college. In this
case, r2 will have a relatively large effecton the number of persons who
attend at 1eas one year of college. Thisincreased flow into the first
year of college may dominate the negative effectof r2h on the Probability of
choosing engineering conditional onattending college one year and being a type 2. (See
Appendix 2, equation A2.5) A fullanalysis of these issues would require aseparate paper.15
collegeis monotonicaily related to the value of starting college. Consequently,
Proposition 1 implies that is increasing in A, Ko• r2h, r2,r1, and 021(81 +
anddecreasing in 80.
III. An EconometricFrameworkfor Measuring the Ex Ante Return to Education
In this section I begin by extending equation (10) for the internal rate
of return to consider a wider set of post secondary outcomes, including several
fields of specialization and advanced degrees.I also provide a specification
for earnings associated with the various education outcomes that may be used to
compute the ax post payoffs to education that appear in (10).
The expected present value of earnings conditional on attending school
level a' +1in field cfor a person who has completed s' years of schooling
with c' as the most recent field of specialization is
(11) PV(s' +1,c"Is'.c',X,Z,R) — P(X,Z),1 Y(X,Z,R)
s—s+2 c
+P(X.Z)5,+i,,sI+i,cN Y(X,Z,R),1
where Y(X,Z,R)is the expected present value of earning (conditional on X, Z
and the interest rate R) of obtaining schooling level s in field c,
P(X,Z),+i c" is the probability that a person with characteristics X, Z will
end up with schooling level s in field c given that they currently are at
schooling level s'+l in field c". As illustrated in the two periodmodel, these
educationoutcome probabilities reflect sequential decisions that are made after
each year of schooling based upon information about performance in school, grade
and course requirements associated with particular programs of study, the wages
associated with different educational outcomes, and preferences for particular
fields of study and work. However, to analyze the ex ante return to education,
one may work with the reduced form equations instead of the structural equations,
which is what I do below.
Assuming that in postsecondary school there is no specialization until
after the first year, then the expected present value of earnings for attending
the first year of college for a person who has completed high school (s—0) and





where Y0(X,Z,R) Is the expected present value ofearnings for persons who leave
school after high school. The value of R thatequates the right hand side of
(12) to Y0(X,Z.R) is the ex ante internal rate of returnp to the first year of
college.
To estimate p and examine its dependence on X and Z onemust have
estimates of the P(X Z) functions and the Y(X,Z,R) functions. l.sc Sc
Unrestricted probit models are used for the probability that thehighest
education level achieved by an individual who startedcollege is less than two
years, more than two years but no degree, a college degree in business, etc.
Eighteen mutually exclusive outcomes are considered, as described in the data
section below.
To measure the returns associated with the various educationoutcomes,
assume that the log wage of a person with post secondary education ievels with
field c as the final field of specialization in school and witht years of labor
market experience is
(13) in w — +ZB2 + r(Z) + ast + *(t)
where ast + 4(t) is the experience profile ofearnings and where r5(Z) is the
difference in the log wage the individual receives if she choosesto leave school
with a high school degree and the logwage she expects to receive if it turns out
that she chooses s years of schooling in field c. The values—O corresponding to
a high school degree. Equation (13) assumes that early choices ofpost secondary
field do not affect the log wage conditional ons and the final field c. Note
that these choices still may affect ex ante returns becausethey may alter the
probability that one can attend school in year a in field c. Aptitude and
Achievement and specialization in high schoolmay be captured by elements of the
Z vector.
The wage effect of a particular education scmay depend upon personal
characteristics Z for two reasons. First, Zmay directly influence the effect of
sc on productivity and, as a consequence, wages. People withstrong math
aptitude might get an extra benefit from an engineeringdegree. Second, if
individuals know in advance that they will obtain additionalinformation about
the market payoffs to various education outcomesas they go through school, then
variables that are related to the cx ante completionprobabilities will be
related to the wage that the individualsexpect to receive in the event that ex
post they choose s and c. Appendix 3 demonstrates that this is trueeven for17
variables do not directly alter the effect of a given education level on
productivity. 16
Most of the empirical work assumes that Z is observed by the
econometrician. Consequently, the wage equation is inconsistent with wage
specifications discussed in Willis and Rosen (1979) and Willis (1986), in which
both observed and unobserved personal characteristics shift the percentage effect
of education on wage rates.'7 The Willis and Rosen analysts implies a
relationship between the unobservables affecting education choice (the P(X,Z)
functions) and the unobservables affecting the expected wage associated with a
particular education outcome. I relax the assumption of no unobserved
heterogeneity in expectations about ex post payoffs with a procedure that assumes
that an agent's information about ex post payoffs is reflected in measures of her
expectations about education. There is some evidence of selection bias, but it
has little effect on the results.'8
The estimates of the probit models of the education probabilities may also
be subject to selection bias, since those who choose not to attend college may
have different postsecondary outcome probabilities (conditional on the
observables) than those who do. Some bias undoubtedly exists, but it is worth
noting that the observables that are used have considerable explanatory power.
As shown in Appendix Table A.4, the predicted dropout probabilities are much
larger for those who do not attend college than for those who do and are very
sensitive to the ability measures, family background, and high school curriculum.
16 For example, people who know at the time that they start college that
they will enjoy the study and practice of engineering also know that they are
less likely to switch to another field of study or drop out of college if they
find out during senior year of college that they are bad at and will receive a
low market payoff to engineering. Consequently, the earnings individuals expect
(as of senior year of high school) to receive conditional on ultimately
completing of engineering may be negatively correlated with preferences for
engineering.
17 These papers assume that educational attainment is based on a once-
and-for-all decision, with certainty about the probability of successfully
completing the program chosen.
l8 Berger (1987) estimates wage equation for several majors using data
from the original NLS survey of young men with corrections for selectivity bias
based upon a reduced form multinomial logit model of major choice. He reports
little evidence of selection bias. However, there are severe difficulties in
identifying the effects of selection on wages using conventional approaches. I
do not view his results or those of the present paper as decisive on the issue of
whether selection bias is important.18
As noted below, I have also experiment with adding a vector ofmeasures of
college plans to the education outcome models as proxies for unobservables
infuencing education choice. These add substantially to theexplanatory of the
education models but do not have significantly alter the estimated
relationship
between p and ability, family background, high schoolcurriculum, and whether or
not one started college.
Let R denote the interest rate at which earningsare discounted and




X B1s- ZB2 (15) Y0(X,Z,R) —Qexp
where Q —jexpt)
-rt 20
One may compute p by substituting the estimates of theprobit models of the
education probabilities and equation (15) forY0(X,Z,R) and (14) for the various
values of a and c into (12). The solution will differfrom the cx post return
exp(r1 (z) to starting college unless exp(r(Z) /s) —exp(r(Z)1) for all s
19• If the ex post payoffto education is stochastic conditional on the
information set Z and the fact that expost the individual has found it optimal
to choose Z, then in principle this randomness shouldbe accounted for in going
from the log linear equation (13) to thepresent value of the wage level
Suppose that the ex post payoff is r(Z) + for the various values of Sc, where the ,havemean 0. Then the analysis goes through provided that the for each sc5ave identical distributions.
Intuitively, the effect of randomness
in the log of the wage on theexpected value of the wage level will be the same
for all education outcomes (inpercentage terms)ifthe degree of uncertainty
about the payoffs is the same for alloutcomes.
It should also be noted that addinga transitory error component to
equation (13) leads to similar complications. If thedistribution of the
transitory wage component is the independent of theschooling outcome, then this
randomness changes the present value ofearnings associated with the various
education outcomes by the same factor ofproportionality. However, if the
transitory variation is related to the education leveland/or if the experience
slope of earnings depends upon years ofschooling and the variance of the
transitory component is related to experience, thencomplications arise. In
principle, one could estimate the uncertainty andmodify the internal rate of
return calculations, but I have notattempted to do so.
20• Equation (14)assumes that T does not depend on a and c. Mincer (1974)
presents evidence that this is a reasonable approximation fora.19
greater than 1 and all fields c. Below I compute estimates of p for various
values of X and
IV.Dataand Econometric Specification
IV.1The Sample
TheNLS72is a Department of Education survey of individuals whowere
high school seniors during the 1971-1972 academic year. The initial interview
vas conducted during the Spring of 1972, with followup surveys in 1973, 1974,
1976, and 1979. A subsample was resurveyed in 1986. A subsample of 10306met
various sample selection criteria and had valid data on the variables used in the
education analysis.22 The equations for education outcomes are conditionalon
starting college, which reduces the sample to the 6660 individuals who have at
least some college.
The cross section-time series of observations for each individual used in
the wage analysis was created using information on earnings dividedby hours for
1977, 1978, and 1979, and information on the wage at the beginning and end of
each job held between 1980 and 1986 up to a maximum of the four mostrecent
jobs.23 An observation for 1977 is included if (1) the individualwas not a full
time student in October 1976 nor October 1977, (2) hours worked in 1977was
greater than 1,040. (3) the 1977 real wage was between $.50 and $75 in 1967
dollars.Observations for 1978 and 1979 were included if they met the
corresponding three criteria for 1978 and 1979 respectively. Data for begin and
end job dates (1980-86) were included if (1) the hours worked in theappropriate
21• The present value formula is modifiedslightly If wage growth rates
depend upon the education level, which I consider In the empirical work.
22 The NLS72 contains data on 22,652people, 12,841 of whom were re-
surveyed in 1986. I restrict the sample first to the 16,683 individuals from the
schools that participated in the base year survey, then to the 15,680 for whom
high school test information is available, and then to the 12980 individuals who
were surveyed in each of the 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1979 followups. Information
from the 1986 follow-up was then added, and only those 7358persons who were in
the earlier 12980 sample were included. The sample of 12,890 from the 1972-1979
surveys forms the basis for the analysis of education outcomes. Of these 10306
had valid data on the variables used in the analysis, which is about 61.8percent
of students in the base year sample and 65 percent of students In the baseyear
for whom test data are available.
23
One potential problem with this sample design is that it Is weighted
toward persons who have worked for several different employers.20
year was greater that 1040, and (2) If the real wage was between $.50 and$75 in
1967 dollars. The wage sample contains 38,595 observationson 9239
individuals.24 Descriptive statisticsare provided in Table A.3.
IV.2 Variable Definitions
A few of the variables require discussion. Thehigh school curriculum
measures consist of semester hours in industrial arts, commercial, finearts, and
the 5 main academic subject areas of science, math, socialstudies, English, and
foreign language.25 I also include dummy variables for whether thestudent was
in the academic track or in the general track.
The education outcomes measures include dummy variablesfor whether the
highest level of education an individual had completedas of 1979 is
postsecondary vocational education and no college (V0C79), less than 2years of
college (S0C01479) and 2 or more years of college but nodegree (SOCO1S79).26
Occasionally I use dummy variables for whether an individual hasa college degree
but not advanced degree (COLL79) and whether the individualhas an advanced
degree (ADVJ9). The fields of the college and advanceddegrees are aggregated
from the 4 digit codes reported in the 1979survey. The college majors consist
of
1. Business (including economics andcommunications)
2. Engineering and Technical
3. The Physical Sciences
4. Humanities (English, Foreign Languages, andTheology)
5. Social Sciences, including History,Psychology, Legal Studies,
Consumer Services, and Area Studies,
6. The Life Sciences and Health Fields
7. Education, including Home Economics andLibrary Sciences
8. Mathematics, Computer Science
9. Fine Arts
24 The number ofobservations per person in the wage sample is 4.177 witha standard deviation of 2.34 and arange from I to 11. Fifty-two percent of the
wage observations come from 1977, 1978, or 1979, 21percent come from 1985 or
1986, and 27 percent come from 1980, 1981, 1982,1983, or 1984.
25 Tue
measures of semester hours refer to courses taken betweenJuly 1, 1969 and the date the student willgraduate, and so refer to 10th, 11th, and 12th
grade for most students. The information wasprovided by the high schools. The
semester hour variables were computed by taking thesum of the semester courses
in each subject area, weighting eachsemester course by the number of hours per week that it met. See Altonji (1988).
26
use education as of 1979 rather than educationas of 1986 because not
all students are included in the 1986followup and because the sampling
probabilities for 1986 depend upon educationaloutcomes.21
lO.AMiscellaneouscategory consisting of 7.8 percent of the
persons whose highest education level is a 4 year college degree.
The graduate fields consist of Business, including legal studies and
communications, Social Sciences and Humanities, Technical Fields (including
Engineering, Mathematics, and Computer Science), the Life Sciences and Health,
Education (including Home Economics and Library Sciences) and Miscellaneous,
including fine arts, consumer services, and missing). One Must aggregate to keep
the analysis manageable and because of sample size considerations.27 The college
major indicators are coded as 0 if the individual has an advanced degree in any
field. High school is the omitted category in the wage equations.
The aptitude and achievement measures consist of predicted SAT Math and
SAT_Verbal scores, high school grades and the student's ownassessment(on an
inverse 1 to 5 scale) in the Spring of senior year of whether or not she is
college material (COLABIL).28
The vector in the education equations contains (1) dummy variables
indicating whether the individual is female, black and/or hispanic, (2) a set of
family background characteristics consisting of the levels, squares, and
crossproducts of father's years of education and mother's years of education, the
log of family income, and a set of variables that measure parental influence on
and aspirations for their children, (3) the levels and squares of the predicted
SAT_MATH and SAT_VERBAL scores, high school grades, and COL_ABIL, (4) the high
school curriculum measures. X also includes the level and square of hours per
week spent on homework and controls for the size of community and the region of
the country in which the individual lived in 1972.
27 In computingp is I set s to 1 for S0C01479, 2.75 FOR S0C01579, 4 for
all college degrees and 6 for all advanced degrees.I am ignoring variation in
expectations about how long it will take to get a degree.
28 The NLSHS72 provides standardized scores from each of a battery of six
test that were administered as part of the base year survey. SAT Math and SAT
Verbal scores are available for about one third of the base year sample. I
constructed a composite measure of verbal and mathematics aptitude by regressing
SAT Math and SAT Verbal scores against levels and squares of the 6 tests, the
cubed values of the reading, mathematics, and the vocabulary tests, a cubic in
COL_ABIL, a cubic in high school grades, and dummy variables for race and gender
and taking the predicted values for all sample members.I use the equations to
compute predicted SAT Math and SAT_Verbal scores for each sample member. The R2
for the Math SAT and the Verbal SAT are .711 and .760 respectively.I also
experimented with using the base year reading, vocabulary and math tests directly
and obtained similar fits for the wage and education outcome equations.22
The models are estimated on the subsample ofyoung men, the subsample of
young women, and the combined sample (with a gender dummy variableincluded).
Turning to the wage equations, the wage measure is thelog of real hourly
wage rate in period t.29 In the most of the specifications the variables
that
affect the payoff to the various postsecondary education are restricted to the
aptitude and achievement measures. I include interactions
between SAT_MATH and
SAT VERBAL and (S0C01479 + SOCO1S79), COLL79 andADV79,betweenSAT_MATH,
SAT_MATH2, SAT_VERBAL,andSAT_VERBAL2 and a dummyvariablefor whether the
individual has a college or advanced degree ina technical field, and between
SAT_MATH2 and SAT_VERBAL2 and (COLL79+ ADV79). The variable COL_ABIL is
interacted with [SOCO1479 + S0C01579J and with[COLL79 + ADV79). The X and
appear separately in the equation, along with experience,experience squared, and
a quadratic time trend.
Some of the equations also contain the terma (EXP*s), which is the
coefficient a times the product of experience
(EXP) and years of schooling s.
do not rely upon the sample to estimatea because the range of labor market
experience of the sample is limited, particularly for
college graduates.
Instead, I set a to three alternative values
prior to estimation of the wage
equation and present results for each case. The firstcase is a—O. The second
case is a —.0011,which is the estimate obtainedusing panel data for male heads
of household between theages of 18 and 60 from 1968-1981 from the PanelStudy of
Income Dynamics.3° The third value is.005, which is approximately the point
estimate one obtains when one estimatesa freely in the sample. This value
reflects the explosion in the returnto education in the 80's (Murphy and Welsh
(1988).I take it to be an upper bound for whatthe Class of 1972 contemplated
at the time they were making their decisions.
V. Results
I begin with a brief discussion of the
distribution by education outcome
29 The
use of the hourly wage rate rather than annualearnings provides a crudestandarization for differences acrossmajors in typical hours. However, I
am not considering differences acrossjobs in nonpecuntary attributes. The comparisons between men and women ignore
complications associated with gender differences in labor force
participation and hours worked. In working withwage rates rather than earnings I am alsoignoring the return to education that comes from a reduction in the
unemployment probability, as analyzed in Mincer(1988).
3o The sample is describedin Altonji and Shakotko (1987). Theequation is available from the author.23
and the rates of return associated with the difference outcomes. I then turn to
estimates of the cx ante return (p) to starting college for the pooled, men and
women samples. I then consider in more detail the contributions of gender
differences in (1) personal characteristics, (2) the wage equations, and (3) the
education outcome equations to the gender difference in the rate of return to
education. Next I discuss the effects of aptitude, high school curriculum, and
family background. Finally, I compare estimates of the return to starting
college for college going and non-college going samples.
V.1 Suzmnarv Statistics on Ex Post Returns and Education Outcomes
Because of the large number of education outcomes and the large number
of interaction terms and nonlinearities in the wage equations, it is convenient
to begin with some basic information about the probabilities of the various
education outcomes conditional on starting college and the cx post returns. I
estimated wage models with all interactions terms between Z and the education
outcomes excluded and report the estimates of the cx post effects of the various
education outcomes on the log wage (relative to high school) in columns 1, 3, and
5 of Table A.l. Separate estimates are reported for the pooled, male, and female
samples.
The results show first that the effect of S0C01479 on the log wage is
.0369 for the sample as whole, implying a percentage wage increase of about 3.7
percent. The coefficient is actually negative for men (-.0076).In contrast,
the effect of S0C01479 on the log wage is .0789 for women. Similarly, the
percentage return to men for attending college for two or more years but not
obtaining a College degrees is 5.9 (5.9—exp(.0575) ,whilethe corresponding
value for women is 21.4 percent (21.4— exp(.19455). These differences at the low
education levels have a large effects on the estimated cx ante returns because
about 65 percent of both men and women do not complete college.
The results in Table A.l also show that there are large differences in
the cx post effects of the various college and advanced degrees on the log wage.
For the pooled sample, engineering (.5105). physical sciences (.3367), math and
computer science (.4475) and the physical sciences (.3438) are the college
degrees with the largest cx post returns. At the other end of the earnings
spectrum are humanities (.1676), education (.1588) and fine arts (.1431). There
are broad similarities in the relative returns for men and for women but many of
the estimated returns for specific college or graduate fields are larger for
women than for men, particularly in the case of business, education, and fine24
arts.
When one restricts the coefficients to be the same acrossmajors and
suppresses the aptitude interaction terms, the return (relative to high school)
of college and advanced degrees in technical and nontechnical fieldsmay be
summarized as follows:
Effects of College and Advanced Degrees on the LogWage
(standarderrorsin parentheses)
Pooled Women Men
College. Nontechnical .238 .298 .152
(.015) (.019) (.026)
College. Technical .441 .404 .394
(.023) (.050) (.038)
Advanced, Nontechnical .377 .431 .284
(.033) (.043) (.052)
Advanced, Technical .521 .824 .419
(.038) (.050) (.078)
The results show a large difference in the returns tocollege and especially to
advanced, technical degrees. The coefficient of .824 for women withan advanced
technical degree implies an increase of 128percent over the earnings of high
school graduates. However, only 6 women complete advanceddegrees in a technical
field. The coefficient on FEMALEinthe pooled regression is -.162,and so these
results indicate only that the percentage differential betweenmen and women
narrows with education.
The probabilities of the education outcomes differsubstantially between
men and women. The sample probabilities (not conditionedon starting college)
are reported column 2, 4, and 6 of Table A.l for the pooled,male, and female
samples (respectively). Women are much less likely tomajor in
business/communications, engineering, and the physical sciences thanmen, and are
much more likely to major in education and somewhatmore likely to major in the
humanities.31 These results refer to those whodo not go on to graduate school,
31 Studies of gender differencesin choice of college major include
Polachek (1978) and Blakemore and Low(1981),England (1982) and Berryman (1983).
In this paper I simply examine the implications ofdifferences in college
outcomes for the internal rate of return tostarting college. In particular, I
am not assuming that education choices are made to maximize thepresent value of future income.25
but the gender pattern is consistent with the gender distribution by 4 year
college degree of the combined samples of individuals whose highest degree is
either college or advanced. (Table A.2) 32
V.2 EstImates of the Ex Ante Return to Education
Table 1 reports a variety of estimates of p. The column labels in the
first row of the table indicate whether the sample used to estimate and to
evaluate the education outcome probabilities and the wage and education outcome
equations consists of men and women (columns I and 2) men only (columns 3 and 4)
or women only (columns 5 and 6). The titles of each panel provide information
about the values of the X and Z variables used to evaluate p.
In Panel l.A. p is evaluated at the mean of all variables computed over
the sample that includes both persons who started college and those who did not.
For the men and women combined, the ex ante return is 5.1 when a—O. (column 1).
In Appendix table A.4 I report the probability of various education outcomes and
the cx post payoffs, evaluated at the mean for the pooled sample. The low return
in part reflects the high dropout probability: The cx post return to attending
college for less than two years is 4.1 percent. Columns 2 and 3 present results
based on equations estimated on the sample of males and females (respectively)
and evaluated at the sample means for male and females (respectively). When m is
set to 0, the cx ante return to starting college evaluated at the sample mean for
men is 2.8 percent, while Table A.4 shows that the cx post return to attending
college for less than two years of college is actually negative (..61).31 The
negative coefficient gets a large weight in the estimate of p., because the cx
ante probability of leaving school with less than 2 years of college is .296
(Table A.4). The cx post and cx ante returns for female high school graduates are
closer ((8.5) versus (7.4)), and are much larger than the return for men.
32 also examined the links between undergraduate and graduate field for
those who go on to graduate school. Education majors and life sciences/health
majors are very unlikely to switch fields at the graduate level. 19 of 25
business/communications majors who attend graduate school concentrate in
business, law, and communications. 11 of 15 engineers concentrate in a technical
area in graduate school. The rest go to business, law, or communications
programs. However, social science/services majors are not very concentrated at
the graduate level, and humanities majors are less concentrated than the other groups.
31 The estimate of 2.8 refers to the basecase in which the returns to
education do not depend upon labor market experience. I report estimates
4.1 and 7.3 under alternative assumptions about the size of the
interactions.26
The ex ante returns for both men and women aresubstantially higher if
one allows the ex post payoff to education to increase with labor market
experience.32
Sources of the Gender Difference In the Internal Rate of Return
Is the large gender difference in the rate of return dueto gender
differences in characteristics, gender differences in the educationoutcomes
equations, or gender differences In the market payoffs to education? InAppendix
Table A.5 I report the internal rate of return estimate for the27 possible
permutations of (1) the choice of sample used to estimate thewage equation
(pooled, men, and women), (2) the choice of sample used to estimate theeducation
outcome equations (pooled, men, and women with at leastsome college), and (3)
the sample used to compute the mean values of characteristicsthat are plugged in
the wage and education equations whencomputing the internal rate of return. The
results show that higher ex post payoffs forwomen from most of the college
majors and, in particular, to completing some college areresponsible for most of
the difference. The higher payoffs raise the rate ofreturn by about 5 points.
(Compare Table A.5, columns l.b-9b to columns l.c to 9c).
Given the differences in the college major distributionand given that
these differences are not explained bygender differences in personal
characteristics, one might expect that differences in the educationcoefficients
tend to lower the rate of return for women.They do, by an amount that is
typically about .9 when a —0.(Compare columns 4a-6a to 7a-9a, 4b-6b to 7b-9b,
and 4c-6c to 7c-9c.)
Finally, differences in the personal characteristics ofmen and women do
not have a consistent effect on the difference inreturns.
32• One obtains somewhat differentresults if one computes the
education probabilities as the mean of theprobabilities evaluated over the
sample distribution of X.For the pooled sample, the estimated probability
of College, LT 2 and College, 2+ are .382 and .282respectively. For men
the probabilities are .351 and .301. Forwomen the probabilities are .407
and .275. The probabilities of thecollege and advanced categories
increase relative to those reported inAppendix Table A.4. When the mean
education probabilities (as opposed to theprobabilities computed at the
sample means) are used along the wage equation evaluatedat the sample
means, the estimated internal rate of return for thecase a—0 are 5.5 for
the full sample, 3.1 for men, and 7.8 forwomen. In principle one can
compute an internal rate of return for each of the 10340persons in the
sample and average the result, but I have notattempted to do so. One would
use the micro data to evaluate thewage equation as well as the education
equations.27
The Effects of Aptitude and Achievement Differences
Panel 1.8 of Table 1 shows the difference in the internal rate of return
between individuals who are one standard deviation below and one standard
deviation above (respectively) the overall sample mean in SAT_MATH, SAT_VERBAL,
GRADES and -COL_ABIL (COL_ABIL is on an inverse scale). Using the means and the
model estimates for the combined sample, the estimates of p when a—O are 6.4 and
3.6 for the high and low ability cases. The value of p for the high and low
ability cases for men are 4.2 and 0.5. The corresponding values for women are
8.8 and 5.9. Thus, there is a large difference in the cx ante return to college
for the low and high ability cases.
Does ability raise the return by inducing a favorable shift in the
education outcomes or by raising the ex post payoffs associated with the various
outcomes? For the sample of men with a—O, p is 3.8 and 2.2 for the high and low
aptitude cases when one varies the aptitude measures in the wage equation but
evaluates the education equations at the sample mean. The corresponding numbers
are 8.7 and 6.3 in the case of women. These results in combination with Table
1.8 suggest that for women the main effect of higher ability is to raise the
payoffsto education. For men higher ability increases the return to
college both by raising the cx post payoffs to education and by inducing a
favorable shift in the education outcomes.33 The college dropout probability is
.9097 for the low ability males and .5195 for the high ability males.
Family Background:
Panel l.C compares p for those with family backgrounds that are favorable
to attendance at postsecondary school with those. The results suggest that a
favorable family background raises the return to starting college by a
substantial amount for young men. (1.4% when o—O). On the other hand, a
favorable background is actually associated with a slightly lower return in the
case of women. The probability of graduating from college (conditional upon
With structural equations analogous to those discussed in Section
II. one could distinguish among three channels through which ability affects
p. First, ability alters the distribution of education outcomes holding
expected ex post payoffs constant (e.g., it changes the odds of passing
school requirements). Second, it changes the mix of education outcomes by
altering the cx post payoffs. Third, it alters the cx post payoffs. The
reduced form equations for the education outcomes do not hold constant the
expected cx post payoffs. Consequently, the estimates of the affect of
ability on the distribution of education outcomes lump together the first
two channels.28
starting) is .402 for an individual with the mean values for the pooled sample
and a favorable background and Is .135 for those with an unfavorablebackground.
(Table A.4). The figures for men and women are similar. The effect of
background on the graduation probability has a bigger effect on the ex ante
return for men than women because of the low return to some college formen.
High School Curriculyji
One might expect high school curriculum to affect p for at least three
reasons. First, large numbers of academic courses may increase the ability of
students to handle college courses. Second, the composition ofcourses may
affect the relative probabilities of completing particulardegrees because of
effects on preferences and because knowledge in particular subjectsmay be a
prerequisite to further study. Third, the course variables and dummies for
participation in the academic and general tracks may be indicators of tastes for
college and family pressure to attend college. The aptitude and achievement
measure and family background measures may not fully control for these factors.
In addition, curriculum may alter the ex post payoff to variouspost secondary
outcomes, although the specification of the wage equation used does not allow for
this.34
Panel l.D reports p for individuals who are in the high schooltrack,
take one standard deviation more semester hours in science,foreign language, and
mathematics, and one standard deviation fewer semester hours in industrialarts
and commercial than the sample means for these variables for the fullsample.
Column 2 reports p for individuals are not in the academic track and whoare a
standard deviation below the sample mean in science, foreignlanguage, and
mathematics and a standard deviation above the sample mean in Industrialarts and
commercial courses.Both columns use the means and the model estimates for the
combined sample. When o—0 the difference is .7. The difference forthe sample
means and equation estimates for young men is 1.0. Thecorresponding difference
for women is only .1. Thus, high school curriculum hasa modest effect for men
but only a small effect for women. The difference in theprobability of
graduation between the academic and nonacademic cases is .326 for men and .353
in the case of women. (See Appendix Table A.4) The fact thatacademic curriculum
36 One coulduse a wage model that allows high school curriculum to effect
the return to the various post secondary educationoutcomes. I have chosen not
to add additional interaction terms to thewage equation, in part because the
results of Altonji (1988) suggest that the main effects ofhigh school curriculum
on wage rates are relatively small.29
has a larger effect on the return to starting college for men is due to the fact
that men who drop out of college receive a much lower payoff than women.
Differences in Ex Ante Returns for those Who Do and Those Who Do Not Start
College
Panel i.E reports p evaluated at the sample means for the college going
and non_college going sample. The main result is that p is substantially higher
for those who actually did start college than those who did not. The ox ante
probability for high school seniors of obtaining a college or advanced degree is
much higher for those subsequently choose to start college than for those to do
not. The differential is proportionately larger for men, reflecting a huge
difference in the probability of ultimately dropping out of college between those
who do and do not choose to start college. (See Table A.4).
VI. Modifications to the Eipirica1 Fraework
In this section I consider the effects of modifying the information set
used in forming expectations about the return to college.I also deal with the
problem of selectivity bias in the estimates of the wage equation by using
education plans and actual years of education as indicators of unobserved
differences in the payoff to education.
VI.l The Information Set as of Senior Year of High School
The results for men indicate an important empirical distinction between
the cx ante and cx post returns to education. These results may be misleading if
important variables have been excluded from the information set X, Z that
individuals are assumed to use in evaluating the probabilities of various
educational outcomes when deciding whether to start college. The final education
outcome may appear uncertain given the variables used, but may be known to the
individual at the time they start college. As a check on this, I added measures
of plans (as of senior year) to attend or transfer to a four year college plans
and to obtain a 4 year or advanced degree the education outcome equations.
The results are in Panel l.F of Table 1. For the pooled sample, p is
between .6 percent higher for those planning to attend college than for those who
did not plan to attend college. The differential for men is about 1 percent.
For women, the estimated return is actually a bit higher for those who were not
planning to attend college.I suspect that the gender difference in the effect
of plans is due to the much larger return to some college for women.
VI.2. Adjustments for Unobserved Differences in thePayoffto Education
The estimates of pwillbe biased if I do not include all the variables Z30
thai determine expectations about the payoffs to various levels of education.
Partition Z Into the subvectors 21 and Z2. Assume bothZ1 and 22 are known to
the agent at the time that the decision to attend college is made but that the
econometrician does not observe 22. Since influences the payoff to
postsecondary education, almost any model of the demand for education implies
that it will influence the decision to start college. In this case, the
estimated differential between a high school and college graduate conditionalon
21 will be biased as an estimate of the agent's expectation of the differential
given 21 and 22.
Assume that the expected contribution to lifetime utility ofstarting
college depends upon X and on the vector of payoffs associated with the
different educational outcomes conditional on the information set and 22 and
the fact a particular education outcome will be chosen cx post.Z2 is
unobserved. However, assume that there exists a vector of measures EDe that
indicate how much education the individual expects to attain. These
expectations depend on X, 21 and I make the key assumption that these
indicators are an exact function of X, and Z2. I also impose linearity.
although this could be relaxed. This leads to
(16) EDe +Z1 +Z2fl2
Although Z2 is unobserved, one may solve for
(17) 22 2 —EDe-
[XP0+
Z1fi1)
I approximate the elements ofZ2 fi2 as the residuals of regressions of
the elements of EDe against X andZ1. In practice, the vector EDe consists of
dummy variables for the highest level of post secondary education the individual
expects to complete (vocational, some college, or college and advanced),a dummy
variable for whether the individual will attend a 4year college, and a dummy
variable for whether the individual will start ata two year college and transfer
to a four year college or start at a 4year college.
It is not practical to allow the educationpayoffs to depend on this many
variables, and so I combine them by estimating the equation
(18) YRSACD79 —XC1 +ZG2 +tZ2 3 +
Finally,I allow the wages associated withstopping school after high school,
some college, college, or an advanced degree(respectively) all to depend upon
the index 1Z2 fl2JG331
There are two important limitations of the approach. First, if ihe
vector EDe depends upon factors that are unrelated to the expectations about
payoffs to education in addition to the X variables we control for, then the
estimate 1Z2 G3 will be a noisy measure of the heterogeneity in theeducation
coefficients in the wage equation. For example, Xmay not control adequately for
differences in tastes for education, and these tastes arepresumably reflected in
EDe. Or the elements of EDCmay be noisy indicators of educational expectations.
Second, it is unlikely that one may write r (Z1.Z2) as r
(Z1,[Z2 fl2)C3), which
I am assuming when I use ofinteractionsbetween the educational outcomes and
1Z2
in the wage equation.
A second, closely related approach is to regress YRSACD79 on X,Z1, EDe,
and, form YRSACD79. and add interactions between YRSACD79 and SOCO1479, S0C1579,
and (COLL79 +ADV79)to the wage equation. The basic idea is that many of the
variables that are related to expected educational attainment (given information
as of senior year) may also be related to the ex post payoff to education.
Results
The estimates of the wage equation with1Z2 fl2JC3 included suggest that,
at least for the pooled sample, the variable has only a small effect on the
return to postsecondary education and incorporating the variable does not make
much difference for estimates of p.
When I use the second approach to obtain coefficients (uncorrected OLS
standard errors) of -.0073(.0068) for YRSACD79, .0097 (.0083) for
SOCO1479*yRSACD79, .0165 (.0084) for S0CO1579*yRSACD79, and .053 (.0096) for
(COLL79 + ADV79J*YRSACD79. The positive coefficients on YRSACD79 and the
interaction terms indicate that higher values of YRSACD79 are associated with
higher wage levels regardless of education, and with a higher ex post payoff to
education. In the case of the pooled sample with a—0 the estimate ofp is
unchanged when one uses the augmented education and wage equations. I have also
re-estimated the differences in returns for the college and noncollege going
samples and by ability level, family background, curriculum, and college plans
using the expanded wage model.35 The results are basically similar to those
reported in the tables.
In these calculations the values of the variables used to form
YRSACD79 reflect the differences in ability, family background, etc. thatare
under examination.32
VII. Directions for Future Research
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the demand for
and return to education when educational outcomes are uncertain. The simple
structural model implies an equation relating the rate of return to starting
college to the earnings associated with each of the possible outcomes of starting
college (including dropping out after a year, getting a college degree in math,
etc.) weighted by the probability of the specific outcome. The ex ante internal
rate of return to education depends on factors that affect the odds of completing
various college majors, such as preferences for schooling, aptitude and high
school achievement variables, as well as on the ex post payoffs to various
postsecondary education outcomes.I evaluate the formula for the cx ante
internal rate of return using reduced form models for the probabilities of
various education outcomes and estimates of the cx post payoffs to them. I
estimate the effect of parental background, high school curriculum, academic
ability, and gender on the internal rate of return to starting college. The main
results of the empirical analysis are summarized in the introduction and seem
quite promising.
There is a long research agenda. On the theoretical side, one could
easily follow the suggestion in footnote 15 and use the model to analyze the
probability of starting college and the supply of college graduates in various
fields. It would be useful to relax a number of the special assumptions of the
model. It might also be useful to examine the screening/human capital debate
from the perspective of the sequential choice model.36
On the empirical side, a number of refinements to the model and
36• For example, Lang and Kropp (1988) basea test of human capital models
versus screening/sorting models on the idea that an increase in the school that,
to a first approximation, increases in the compulsory school leaving age should
not alter the distribution of education above the level affected by the increase.
They are correct in the case of conventional human capital models that assume
perfect foresight about education choices. In the model in the paper, however, a
law requiring all high school graduates to attend the firstyear of college would
result in an increase in the fraction of high school graduates who graduate from
college, because some of the reluctant college attendees would find out after the
first year that they are type 1 or type 2 individuals or have higher graduation
probabilities than expected given K0 and A. (In their conclusion Lang and Crop
note that "A compulsory schooling law might affect individuals it is does not
directly constrain if. .. forcingpersons to go to school longer teaches them that
they are benefiting from higher level schooling.") One would have to expand the
model to incorporate explicit assumptions about how firms value knowledge and
ability before it could be used to address the issue of education as a screen.33
On the empirical side, a number of refinements to the modeland
improvements in the empirical estimation should be implemented beforestrong
conclusions can be drawn about the factors that influence thecx ante return to
starting college.The absence of standard errors on the internal rate ofreturn
estimates should also be kept in mind in considering the results.37One might
also wish to experiment with letting the cxpost payoff to college depend upon
specific courses taken and grades. In principle, one can do thisusing data
from the Post Secondary Transcript Survey of NLS72.However, it would be
necessary to add forecasting equations for grades and course counts to the
education outcome model. In view of the large shift in the cx post payoff to
college in the 80's, more attention should be given to modellingexpectations
about the earnings associated with various educationoutcomes. The problem of
sample selection bias in the estimates of the wage and educationequations
remains a potentially serious issue.
Another natural extention would be to distinguish between thecx ante
return to high quality and low quality colleges. Differences indropout
probabilities may be more important than differences in cxpost payoffs in
determining the cx ante return to attending a particular school.
The most interesting and also the most difficult extensionwould be to
expand the structural model of education decisions in Section II intoa model
that is rich enough to take to the data. One could thenreplace the reduced form
equations relating personal characteristics as of senioryear to education
outcomes with a structural model of the sequence of education decisions
leading
to a final education outcome. With transcript data oncourses and grades and
with survey information on attitudes toward school,one might be able to devise
an empirical counterparts to the equations for knowledge and forgraduation
probabilities and the preference variables in the theoretical model.
37. Estimating the standarderrors is difficult because the estimate of p
is a function of hundreds of parameters from the educationequations and the wage
equation as well as the values of X and Z that enter thewage and education
equations. One could estimate the variance matrix of the modelparameters and
then use a simulation method to compute the standarderror of p. However, given
the number of parameters involved, it would bevery difficult to estimate the
variance matrix. Or one could apply bootstrap methods to the entireproblem.
The bootstrap approach would involve drawing randomsamples from the sample used
in the study, estimating all of the modelparameters, computing p for each of the
random samples, and computing the variance of the result. Thisapproach is
beyond my computing resources given the large number of differentspecifications I examine.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition I
I first examine the properties of V2(g2, j) and then use the assumption
that Fh and Fh are stochastically increasing inK0 and A to establish
properties of E(V2(g2, j)1K0, A). Proposition 1 follows almost iunniediately.
Lemma A1.1: V2(g2, 2) is nondecreasing in2h' strictlyincreasing in
and nondecreasing in
Lemma A1.2: V2(g2, 1) is nondecreasing in2h' g2, strictly increasing in
and nondecreasing in Y and Y
2h 2m
Proof: Recall that 2—(g2. g2}. Both lemmas are obvious upon inspection
of equations (6) and (7), since the max function is nondecreasing in all
arguments and 2h and 2m are assumed greater than
Y1/(l +R).
Lemma Al.3: EV2(K1,A,2
K0, A, c1)/Y0,c inorh, is strictly increasing in K0
and A, 2h'O' Y2/YØ and Y1/Y0. It is strictly decreasing in R.
Proof: The first argument of the Max() function in on the left side of
(7) is strictly increasing in 2h and g2h (given T2h >Y1/(l+R))and strictly
decreasing in R. The second argument is strictly increasing in
T2m'and Y1
and strictly decreasing in R. The third argument is strictly increasing in
Y1.
Consequently, the distribution of at least one of the three arguments is strictly
increasing in '12h' '12m' and and strictly decreasing in R. Furthermore, the
distribution Fh of (g2.g2) is assumed to be stochastically increasing in
K0
and A, which implies that the distribution of the arguments that are strictly
increasing in and/or g2 are stochastically increasing in K0 and A. These
facts and the fact that positive shifts in the distribution of one or more
elements of a set of random variables increases the expected value of the maximum
of the set establishes the results in the lemma.
The same line of reasoning establishes3
Laa Al.4: EV2(K1,A,l I A,c1)/Y0,c—mor h ii strictly increasing in
A, and ft ii strictly decreasing in R.
Proposition 1 follows from LemmaAl.3and Al.4 once on.note.thatthe
value of starting college Is the maximum of the value of starting college
in m or in h and recalls that
V1(K0, A a1) 0iE(V2(gJ)1K0.A.m1)
and
V1(K0, A .6,h1) —L E(V2(g2, i)1K0.A,h1)1
Appendix 2: The Post Secondary Education Outcome Probabilities
All type 0 individuals drop out of college.Type 1 individuals drop
out of college if
(A2.l) g2(1+r)•(1—g2)< 1
(1.R)3 (1.R)2(1.R)
or if g < (R/r), where (l.z-) -(l.r2)/(l+r1),c —hor m.
Type 2 individuals would choose to drop out rather thanspend a second
year as a humanities major if
g < (R/r)
Using an equation analogous to (A2.l) one concludes thattype 2
individuals would prefer to drop out rather thanmajor in math if
g< (R/r_). Consequently, theydropout of school if both
g < (R/r) and g, <(R/r,).Thus.






where Fb is the marginal CDF of g and F is thejoint CDF of g2h, g. and
-2/(1O2).I have suppressed the fact that both F and F are
conditional on the first period field c.
It is obvious from inspection of (A2.2) thatP is increasing in 8,.
Since F > F, P11 is also decreasing in 8. The other resultsin2
Proposition 3.a follow from the fact that P1 is increasing in the value of
F_ and F and the fact that the monotone likelihood ratio property implies
that these functions are decreasing in K and A.
The probability P12 is the probability that a person is type 1 or type
2 has a sufficiently high graduation probability to attempt to complete
college but is unsuccessful in doing so. The equation is
—(i—Os) (1—O) f(1—g2)dF(g1IK0.A)
+






+ (i-e)o f f (l-g2)dF(g2,g,Iç,A) l/r
Thefirst term is the probability that the person is type l has a
graduation probability above the critical value R/r, but then fails to meet
the requirements in the humanities. The next term is the probability that the
individual is type 2, attempts to graduate in m, and is unsucessful. The last
term is probability that the person is type 2, attempts to graduate in
humanities, and fails to do so. The ranges of integration reflect the fact
that type 2 individuals are best off in an expected value sense from choosing
a if
g2>R/r, andg2> g2x/r.3
They are best off choosing h if
gzh> R/rh
Itis obvious that P2 is decreasing in e0.Anincrease in r unambiguously
increases the term on the 3rd line of (A2.3). If r> z-, it iseasy to show
that the derivative with respect to rofthe sumofthe terms on the 2nd and
4th lines of (A2.3) is positive. (The increase in rinduces some students
to wove from humanities to math even thoughg > g2_.This raises 12) This
proves that P12 is increasing in r if r >r.Using the same methods it
is easy to show that P2 is increasing in both r and r if r—r.An
increase in R works in the opposite direction,reducing the fraction of
students who attend college in the second year, P1,2.
Without further assumptions about FhandF, the effects of increases
in K0, A, and 8areambigous for reasons discussed in the text.
I now turn to Proposition 3.3. The equation for + P1 is I minus
the expressions for P11 and P2 in (A2.l) and (A2.2). Forcompleteness, I




The first term of (A2.4) is 9 times The
second term is e2times
,g>RJr) .Prob(g<g2rr, g>R/r). The equation for
P1 is:
1





+ P1is decreasing in because all type 0 persons drop out
after the first year. An increase in R reduces the fraction of students who
attend college in the second year. lowering both Pim and P1N.
To prove that P1 +P1_is increasing in A and K0 when r -r,note





The assumption that CDFs Fh and F have the monotone likelihood ratio
property in A and K0 implies almost immediately that the first term is
increasing in A and K0. The fact that max(O.g2 -R/r,g2_
-R/r.)is5
nondecreasing in g and g and strictly increasing over part of therange
between 0 and 1 and the assumption about F implies that thesecond term is
strictly increasing in A and K0. The assumption about F implies that
1 -F(R/r,.R/z-IK0,A) is strictly increasing inK0 and A. Consequently, the
third term in (A2.6) is also strictly increasing inK0 and A.
The positive effect of O on the Pm +P1when r -rfollows from
the fact that the weight on (l-e) is (1-es) times theproduct of the
expectation of gm given g> r/r_ and the probability thatg> r/r. This
weight is strictly less than the weight on $, which is (1 -eo)times the
product of the expectation of max(g, g) given that max(g,g) > R/rand
Prob(max(g,g) > R/r).1
Appendix 3: The Expected Ex Post Return to College When Returns are Uncertain.
In this appendix I show that variables that alter the cx ante
probability of completing college, such as ability or high school preparation,
will be related ox post to the earnings conditional on completing college even
if the variables are not related to the unconditional distribution of the
return to college.I work with the model in Section 2 but impose the
simplifying assumption that there is only one field of study in college with
return R2. Let F(g2IK, A) be the cdf of the probability g2 of completing
graduation requirements conditional on K0 and A.I assume that this CDF has
the monotone likelihood ratio property in K0 and A. Since there is only one
field of college I need only distinguish between type 0 and type 1
individuals. Type 0 individuals dislike college and will drop out of college
after the first year regardless of g and R2. Type 1 individuals have no
nonpecuniary preference between working and college.
I drop the assumption that the returns to college are nonstochastic.
Let R2 denote the return to a college degree. I assume that R2 is equal to
(A3.1) R2 —r2(K0,A) +#,
where#hasa continuous distribution over the range (O,) and is independent
of K5, A, 0, g2, and whether the individual will complete graduation
requirements conditional on g2. At the end of the first year of college, the
individual learns .Forsimplicity. I analyze the case in which the2
nonstochastic portion r2(K0, A) of R2 is a constant which I set to 0.I also
set Y1 to Y0/(l +R).I discuss the case in which r2(K0,A) depends onI( and A
at the end of the section.
Let E(jK0. A, graduation) be the expectation of conditionalon
graduation from college, I(, and A. Under the assumptions madeearlier, the
following proposition holds.
Proposition A3: E(IKO, A, graduation) is decreasing in I( and A.
Note that by assumption K0 and A are independent of .Furthermore,
both are determined prior to starting college and prior to therealization of
.Theproposition holds because K0 and A increase the probability of
completing graduation requirements. This lowers the critical value of
required to justify staying in college a second year of college andtaking the
risk of failing to meet the requirements.
To formally prove Proposition A3. note that the value functionat the




for individuals who turn out to be type 1.(The value function for type 0
individuals is irrelevant, since these individuals always drop out).
A type 1 individual prefers to remain in school if #>R/g2.
Given the assumption that with > R so that education is profitable if the
person knows she is type 1, will receive 4',andis certain to graduate
(g2 —1),then3
(A3.3) E(g2, graduate) — > Rig2)
which is strictly decreasing in g2. It remains to evaluate the expectation of
conditional on I(, A. and college graduation, which is
(A3.4) E(E( > R/g2)K0, A, graduate) —E(K0, A,graduate).
The above expectation is
(A3.5) E($1K0A, graduate) -fE(I+.R/g2)dF'cg3jK0.A)
where dF is the product of the probability density of college graduation






the assumption that dF has the monotone likelihood ratio property implies that
dr has the monotone likelihood ratio property. Since E(I# >R/g2)is
decreasing in R/g2, it follows that E(#IKO, A, graduate) is decreasing in K0
and A, which completes the proof.4
The proposition does not examine the effects ofnonpecuniary
preferences. In the above model variables that alter 80 and8 do not alter
the expectation of conditional on K0, A, and graduation.80 and 01mayalter
the expectation of conditional only on graduationby altering the
distribution of K0 and A among those who choose to startcollege. If one
extends the model to include a third preference type who "likes"(receives a
nonpecuniary benefit from attending) college, then one may show that the
expected value ofis negatively related to factors that increase theex ante
probability that the individual will like college even after one conditionson
K0 and A.
If r2(K0, A) is a positive function of I( and A, then theproposition
remains true, since the increase in r2 lowers the critical value ofat which
the individual decides to drop out. If elements ofK0 and A lower r2(K0, A),
then the overall effect of increases in these elementson E(IK,, A,
graduation) is ambiguous.Table 1
TUE INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN TO STARTING COLLEGE (p)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Saaple Used to Estimate Ken Man Men Men Women Women
and to Evaluate the and and
Wage and Education Women Women
Equations:a





.0011 6.2 4.1 8.4
.005 9.0 7.3 10.8
l.B AbilityLevelC
HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW
EXP*s Slgpe (a)
.000 6.4 3.6 4.2 0.5 8.8 5.9
.0011 7.4 4.9 5.4 2.1 9.5 7.0
.005 9.9 8.0 8.3 5.7 11.7 9.8
1.CFamily Backgroundd
FAV UNFAV FAV UNFAV FAV UNFAV
g.'° 5.4 4.8 3.3 1.9 7.3 7.6
.0011 6.4 5.9 4.5 3.3 8.3 8.5
.005 9.2 8.7 7.6 6.6 10.7 10.8
1. D High School Curriculume
AC NONAC AC NONAC AC NONAC
*sgpe 5.5 4.8 3.1 2.1 7.7 7.6
.0011 6.6 5.9 4.4 3.5 8.6 8.5
.005 9.3 8.7 7.5 6.8 11.0 10.8
i.EStarted coiiege
Yes NO YES NO YES NO
EXP*s Slgpe (a) 5.6 4.1 3.5 0.9 7.8 6.8
6.7 5.3 4.7 2.4 8.7 7.8
.005 9.4 8.3 7.8 6.0 11.0 10.3l,F College
YES NO YES NO YES NO
EXP*gSlgpe (a)
.000 5.3 47 3.1 1.9 7.3 7.7 .0011 6.4 5.8 4.4 3.3 8.2 8.6 .005 9.2 8.6 1.5 6.6 10.7 10.9
a.Thetext for the specification of the wage model and the 18 probit modelsfor the educationoutcomes.The internal rate of return is computedusing the estimatesofthese
equations evaluated at the sample means of all variables unless otherwisenotedinthe titlefor each panel of the table.
b. The Exp*s slope coefficient a is the coefficient on theproduct of years of
academic education and experience. The wage equation was estimated withthis parameter
set to .000, .0011 and .005 respectively. The alternative estimates of the
wage equation were used to evaluate the rate of return.
c. The wage and education equations are evaluated at the sample means of allvariables
except those related to ability, which are set to either high or low values. In thecase
of "High" ("Low") ability SAT VER3AL, SAT MATH, CRADES, and-COL_ABIL are set to the mean
for the particular sample (pooled, men, or women) plus (minus)one standard deviation.
The standard deviations are taken from the full sample, so the differencein the values of
the aptitude measures for the high and low aptitude cases is thesame regardless of
whether the group analyzed is men and women, men, or women.
d. The wage and education equations are evaluated at the sample means of allvariables
except the family background variables which are set to either high or low values. In
the case of favorable background father's education, mother's education, andthe log of
family income are set to the mean for the particular sample (pooled, men, orwomen) plus
(minus) one standard deviation. The dummies for whether the individual discussedplans
with parents and whether he/she was influenced by parents were set to 1.Dummy variables
for whether lack of parental interest interfered with higi school educationand for
whether lack of money interfered with high school education were set to 0. The
definition of "unfavorable" is symmetric to the favorable case. The standarddeviations are taken from the full sample.
e. The wage and education equations are evaluated at the sample means of all variables
except those related to high school curriculum. In the case of AC, semester hours of math,
science, and foreign language are the means for the particular sample (pooled,men, or
woemn) plus one standard deviation. Industrial arts and commercial were set to the
sample means minus one standard deviation. In the case of NONAC, the oppositeadjustment
was made. The standard deviations of the curriculum variables are taken from the
particular sample (pooled, men and women).I do so because the standard deviations of
industrial arts and commercial courses differ dramatically between men andwomen. In the
case of AC. the dummy variable for whether the individual was in an academicprogram was
set to one and the dummy for a general high school program was set to 0. (Vocational is
the reference group in all equations.) In the case of NONAC, thedummy for academic
program was set to 0 and the dummy for general high school program was set to the
conditional probability that an individual is in a generalprogram given that he or she is
not In the academic program.
1. The wage and education equations are evaluated using the samplemeans and women
alone of those who started college (Yes) and the sample means for those whodidnot start
college (No).
g.The wage and education equations are evaluated at the sample means of all variables
except those related to college plans. The education equations were augmented to include
aseriesof measures of educational plans. Individuals are defined to have 4year college
plans ("Yes") if they Indicated they planned to complete college and if they indicated
that they planned to attend or to transfer to a 4 year college.They are defined not to
have 4 year college plans if they indicated that they did not plan tocomplete college
and did not plan to attend or to transfer to a 4 year college.Table A.l
LogWag.Coefficients andSampleProbabilities for Various
Post Secondary Education Outcomes.
Hen and Women Women
'.4 q h 6
Wage Prob. Wage Frob. Wage Prob.
Coaf. Coef. Coef.
Education OutCome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
College, LT 2 0.0369 .286 .0.0076 .264 0.0789 .308
(0.0116) (0.0180) (0.0142)
College. 2+ 0.1292 .272 0.0575 .287 0.1945 .258
(0.0128) (0.0200) (0.0174)
Cohere Derree
Business. 0.3153 .067 0.2113 .077 0.4647 .039
communicatIons (0.0215) (0.0300) (0.0337)
EngIneering 0.5105 .017 0.4436 .031 0.5061 .002
(0.0290) (0.0353) (0.1012)
Physical sciences 0.3367 .009 0.2749 .014 0.2968 .004
(0.0680) (0.0842) (0.0778)
Humanities 0.1676 .023 0.0963 .018 0.2177 .027
(0.0312) (0.0556) (0.0361)
Social sciences, 0.1939 .086 0.1292 .089 0.2342 .083
law services (0.0209) (0.0345) (0.0252)
Life Sciences. 0.3133 .075 0.1548 .074 0.4282 .077
health (0.0215) (0.0347) (0.0254)
Education, home 0.1588 .070 0.0317 .038 0.2225 .101
economics, (0.0209) (0.0427) (0.0224)
libraryscience
Math, computer 0.4475 .006 0.4204 .006 0.4550 .006
science (0.0480) (0.0739) (0.0648)
Fine Arts 0.1431 .014 0.0256 .011 0.2281 .018
(0.0414) (0.0617) (0.0471)
Miscellaneous, 0.2278 .031 0.2327 .029 0.3024 .033
Field missing (0.0281) (0.0454) (0.0310)
Advanced
Math, physical 0.5369 .0047 0.4234 .0076 0.8470.0018
science, (0.0725) (0.0786) (0.0515)
engineering, computer
science
Business law, 0.5138 .0077 0.4302 .0110 0.5982.0044
communications (0.0541) (0.0611) (0.1154)
Humanities, social 0.3697 .0068 0.2108 .0067 0.4267 .0068
(0.0550) (0.0515) (0.0861)
Life sciences. 0.3916 .0071 0.2725 .0073 0.4960 .0068
health (0.0711) (0.1137) (0.0767)
Education, ho.. 0.3436 .0117 0.2040 .0046 0.4368 .0186
economics, library (0.0556) (0.0977) (0.0624)
science
Arts, services, 0.3181 .0060 0.3194 .0073 0.2973 .0047
field of degree (0.0927) (0.1618) (0.0829)
missing
a) The other variables in the wageequationaredescribedon page 26 and 27.
Interactions terms involving the education outcomes are included. The standard errorsIn parenthesis allow for arbitrary forms of hetaroscedascictry and correlationamong residuals for agiven individual or individuals from thesame high school. The R2 for
columns 1. 3. and 5 are0.1958.0.1I7S and0.2062 respectively.






























S of Males S of Majors S of Females S of
With This Who are With This Who are
Major Male Major Female
Individuals with CollegeorCollege and Advanced Degrees
22.84 71.19 9.24 28.81
7.96 93.60 .54 6.40
3.26 72.73 1.22 27.27
4.68 39.88 7.06 60.12
21.74 50.47 21.34 49.53
17.38 48.04 18.90 51.96
9.06 26.07 25.82 73.93
1.83 54.00 1.56 46.00
2.50 36.27 4.42 63.73
9.06 49.26 9.38 50.74
1479 1464
Individuals with Advanced Degrees
24.66 70.59 10.28 29.41
15.06 48.89 15.76 51.11
16.44 51.06 15.76 48.96
10.28 19.23 63.16 80.77
16.44 60.00 10.96 40.00











BLACK BLACK.AI.INDIAN 0.09926 0.29902 0.11419 0.31809 0.11350
HISP IICAN.FU1OR1Q3.LATUIAMERICAN 0.03541 0.18483 0.04292 0.20272
0.31729




CFAED FATNESS aXRA?I0II CaIPOSITE 12.600612.30669 11.50632 1.86514
OCED 143ThESS ED4EATIOII,csiit 12.32621 2.0847411.51238 1.6490912.14293
2.33533
LSOINC LOG FMIILY II IN1972 8.974 0.386 6.7840.569 6.936
1.95010
DQ17.R4ltESIEY WOBLD INTESFESE WIThED 0.28827 0.45298 0.36048 0.48020
0.578




FLANDScDPARENTSDISOUSSED FUTUREPLANS 0.78662 0.40970 0.70638 0.45548
0.49738
PLAIIINFLPARENTS INFUDICED FUTUREPLANS 0.438670,49624 0.37259 0.48356 0.39358
0.42404




BQ7 TI1€/'.IKSPENTON 4.41934 3.26270 3.63856 2.88145 4.01146
HSACAD US-FND1l IS ACADD4IC(1—YES.0—4403 0.45216 0.49773 0.16318 0.36958 0.38045
HSGDI ME-PCONI ISOSNERAL(1—YES0—II0J 0.314960.46452 0.41001 0.49190 0.31046
0.48562
.LFCOX ScI. P(IHITYTO LLEGE 1.79352 0.75499 1.93462 0.76172 1.70633
0.48305
FRFQTIRUSai. URS SCIENCE•FRED. 18.7253910.0014114.83691 8.7924617.48391
0.74410
FRFQT12 sai. w FONSIONLA$OUAGES FRED 10.8467511.32240 5.21479 8.65498 9.6125010.36436
PRFQTHR3SaI. lIES SOGIAL STUDIES. FRED. 26.23072 7.6712226.00046 7.7475926.12846
FRFQTIU44SVI. EIGUSII•FRED 29.99487 6.6073029,34478 6,4705129.73800
7.52894
6.57107
PRFQTHRS SEN. 144TSa44T1cS. FRED 10. 17939 9.99209 14.61655 9.30781 18.20686
FRFQT2IE6Sal. lIES INDUSTRIAL ARTS. FRED 5.6140311.90266 7.5418914.16043 5.98975
9.49172
12.40059
FRFQT1IE7$834. lIES CaIUIL STUDIES.FRED 14.0541516.5050019.2050819.85767 15.06001
PRFQTIW.65831. FINE ARTS. FRED 8.6857913.17194 7.2445011.85174 9.35001 13.36491 Ajt. £cL1.vL Ns..ur.s
SATH_HAT PREDICTED SAT E: 444TH 427.42329100.86270370.5655875.29589409.7615786.85755
SATV_1IATPREDICTED SAT SE: VERBAL 397.9692397.42458344.3291974.17472383.3651683.23649
3Q28 DOES STUD.BELIEVE HE HAS OGLL. ANIL. 1.88734 0.96677 2.44744 1.09906 1.86442
DQS ONADED Ill UTIEI SQ1L 80.95753 7.5827277.89812 7.07144 79.45181 6.04694
LocaU
S1L7O46I STUDENT CaCS IRON SHALl. HQIETCMII 0.27760 0.44783 0.27820 0.44817 0.27798
I'WCITYSTUDDIT 5 PEal ItRl CITY 0.11866 0.32341 0. 12000 0.32594 0.13137 0.33789
NEDSURB STUDENT PEal SUBURBOF lIED CITY 0,07869 0.26927 0.07099 0.25605 0.08197 0 27440
BIGCITY STUDENT FRI BIG CITY 0.08319 0.27918 0.07292 0.26004 0.09406 0 29199
BIGSURBSTUDENT CaS FRl SUBURB OF BIGCITY 0.08723 0.28210 0.05971 0.23698 0.09090 0.28755
HLGSCITY STUDENTCaS 114*34 NUDE CITY 0.04773 0.21322 0.03714 0.18915 0.05465 0.22735
H1JIEDIJ4SSTUDENT S PROtSUBURBOF NUDECITY 0.06782 0.25145 0.030a2 0.17265 0.06305 0.24313
NOSD*TR RION—WRTU-CD4Th,Aj. 0.28394 0.45188 0.30599 0.46009 0.20849 0.45318
SWill REGION—SOUTH 0.326230.46683 0.35293 0,47764 0.33158 0.47090
WEST REGION'4JESTTabI• A.3 Cont..Inu.d
COLLEGEGR ADVANCED
VARIABLE LABEL ?M STANDARD
DEVIATION
BLACE BLACK.AER. INDIAN 0.06863 0.25287
HIS? PXICAJI.PUfl1TGRICO.LATIN NR1CA1I 0. 01664 0.12797
cSZX SEX TOSITE: MALE —OFENALE —1 0.487450.50007
?*1y 1.jrvd
CTARD FATHENS ThUC*TION. COIFOBITE 13.6885'.2.66764
Q PCNENS EGUCATION. CalIOBITE 13.293232.20082
1.OGINC LOG FAMILYIIICONEIN 1972 9.212 0.533
1Q17JON POIIEY ffi0SLD IKTFERE WITH EG 0.1846'.0.36823
VENEN *EN IN E.DI.SCIOCL 0.364930.40149
PLAIIOSCDPARENTS DISCUSSED FUTURE PLANS 0.86005 0. 32'. 95
PLANINFL PARENTS INFUE)ICED FUTURE PLANS 0.532'.'.0.49903
BQ1TPUI? UNINT!RESTV) PARENTS INTENFERE EwCnr—o 0.091060.2877'.
Risk$o1Prvgr
807 TflC/WK SPENT ON ID1CRX 5.561373.53350
HSACAD Ri-FSOGRM4 IS ACADDIIC (1—YES.0—NO1 0.798160.40143
USCEN Ri-PSOGRAM ISCENERAL (1—YES.0—BOl 0.170230.37590
COLLPC EGIO3OLPCIMITYTO COLLEGE 1.72349 0.72679
PRFQTUR1SEN. IRS SCIENCE •P920. 23.523339.60960
PRFQTHR2 SEN. I FGREIaI LANCRIAGES. P920 17.3859911.17244
P#FQT13 SD. SOCIAL STUDIES. P9EV. 28. 42870 .62580
1\juu4 SEN. I ENSLISH •P9EV 30.90932 6.59548
PRPQTRESSEN. IRS MATUD4ATICS• P93) 24.493348.47319
FRYQTIOL6 SD. INDUSTRIAL ARTS •FRED 2,95682 7. 56'.18
PRFQTUR7SEN. ._CQtXALSTUDIES,FRED 8. 3267510.63317
PRI'QTIIIIEDO. FINE ARTS, FRED 9.8900614.34163
Alatitud. d Achi.vLMs.aur..
SAN_HAT PREDICTED SAT SCGRE: MATH 502,6562693.36001
SATVMAT PREDICTED SAT SE: VERBAL 467.5004392.06562
103 GRADES IN BII SaloOl. 65.611536.04901
1326 DOES SliD. BELIEVE HE HAS COIL. ABIL. 1.361190.56564
Loc.t.1
StTI STUDENT COTS IRON SMALL HCIIETONN 0.269160.4334'.
PCITY STUDENT CO'S IRON 1420111 CITY 0.107710.31007
NEDSURESTUDENT COS IRON SUBURB I CITY 0.078490.26898
BICCITY STUDENTCOTS tHi BIG CITY 0.066600.26433
IIGSURB STUDENT COS FROI SUBURB BIG CITY 0.113460.3172'.
HUGEGITY STUDENT aBfS FRQI HUGE CITY 0.050200.21857
HUDESURI STUDENT COTS IRON SUBIMS OF HUGE CITY 0.112130.31558
NrUITR REGIcI(—4IGRT1I-CEiOTR#L 0.277600.44769
SOiTH REGION—SOUTh 0.30071 0.45664
WEST REGION—WEST 0. 140400.35564TaLL. A.4 lb.Pr.3tlILt,. owd La9 Wow_.. Gl. tot Lduc.LI.. Outcow.. (Coiil.tt.r. corr..poodto p...laA.5 C,0, 1 .nd FotTaLL. 1)
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.L!GL.LT 2 .1975.0400 .5272.0409.2434.0476 .5421.0205 .2334.0409 .5680.0409 OSLLEGE, 2' .3474.1307 .3600 .1301 .3416.1314 .3570.1103 .3*90.1307.3735.0307 00L1.F.L T( .0114.4661.0003 .5270 .0046 .4910 .0003 .573*.0034.5242.0004.3270 LL..EGENOIIT!CN .4217.2276.0910 .2200 .3739.2374 .0993 .5996 '334.2210.0510.227k ADVANCETECh .0000.1267.0000.6261 .0000 .596.8 .0000.7107 .0000.6261.0000.6207 ADVANCENOUTs .0155.3938.0015.3652 .0563 .3666 .0004.3970 .0100 .3676 .0004 .4334 1CLLE .5432.0901 .9072.0105.6050.1013 .0000.0642.5532.0926 .9422.0165 .4390 .2338 .0913.2299.3765.2403.0996.2007 .4366.2233 .0574.2206 ADVANCED .0151 .3961.0013 .3652.0163.3686 .0004.3010.0*00.3676 .0004.4334
A. N.... 0. ILbAbilityS.LowAbIlity C. F.,. 5.ckruuiid C. lOot.,. 5ockroi.id U ANTEW1AGEU AltEC LCC U ANTE LWMGC U ANTE LOAGE U MITE LWG4 C*Xy PROS CAINS GAIN PROS GAIN PROS GAIN PROS GAIN
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COLLEGE. LI2 .2153 .0151 .5183.0151 .2022 .0047 .5134.07)2.2446CIII.6174.0958
COLLEGE,2• .3051.1*06 .3322 .1061.3)01 .2011.3250 .1830 .2094.1966.336).1986
COLLEGElEON .0000.3161 .0000 .3751 .0000 .414) .0000 .3231 .0000.375) .0000 .3781
COLLEGENOItTECII .3900.2966.0902 .2749 .3540 .2071 .1013 .2521 .4520.2776 .0464 2134
ADVANCET .0000 . .0000 . .0000 . .0000 . .0000 . .0000
ADVANCE IIOKTWN .0101.4923 .0003 .4915 .003) .47)0 .0003 .5171 .003) .4900 .0000.4957
COLLEGE .5212.1520 .0106 .1270 .8429.1562.1914.1120 .5440 .1479 .0531.1256
COLLEGE .3010.2964 .0002 .2740 .3540.207).1013.2527 .4329 .2176.0454 .2034
ADVANCED .0101.4923 .0003.40)5 .0031 .47)0 .0003.5177 .0031 .4009 .0000.4917
a)lb... sot. prcbabiUti.sera Lb. prohebilities •fLb. various .ducation outcau.s.lb.coItt.catasori..COLLEGE
ITICS. COLLEGET. ADVANCE T, andADVANCED N09TEC1Iare d.fin.din Lb. L.xt.. ALL 10colL.iadegreecategoriC,and.1)
S.dvinc.dc.t.Iori.. a,. ccln.d In COLLEGEsodADVANCED. lb. los ens. .Io for a particular education categoryisLb.
w.ibtsdsv.reg.. of the los weg.dlff.rantiaL.(r.Lat$v. to a high echool •r.&.at.) for lb. earl....dsrse.1. Lb. cat..ry
ualn lb. .e ant. prclabillt.IaI cc wiighte. Tb. values of Lb. individuslchar.ct.risticsu..d is .v.Luata Lb. .duCatlOn
prababllittesand tog wag. dltf.r.ntist. at. d.scrib.d in Lb. footnote. to TibIa 1. 5.. Table 1. In. a for the A cols.
to. c tar Lb. I colunta. to.dforLb.C cut.—.., footnote . for Lb. 0 c.i.s. En. Iforthe L coL.-a.endto. $ for the F
cal.-...Table A.5
GENDERDIFFERENCES EN TUE INTERNAL KATE OF RETURN TO STARTING COLLECE (p)
Ia2a3. 4a Sa6a 7aRa9alb2b3b 4bSb 6h
Wage EquationSaapI. HFHFHPHFHFHFHF HF HF K NK H H H
EducationEquationsHFHF HFKK N F F F HFHF HF K N H Sa.ple(Only
Persona who
Start.dCollege)
CharacteristicsUsedHF H FHF K FHF K F HFN FHF K F toEvaluate Education
andWag.Equations:
CP*Slope 51 5 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.9 4.8 4.5 5.0 2.4 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.8 3 2
—.0011 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.? 6.4 6.9 5.95.76.23.1 4.0 3.6 4.34.1 4.5 —.0059.09.1 9.1 9.49.29.68.8 8.6 9.0 7.0 7.2 6.9 7.47.3 7.6
7b8b 9bIc2c3c4cSc6clc8c9c
WageEquation Sap1eK H KF FFF FFFFF
Education Equations FFFHF HF HF KN KFFF S1e(Only
Persons who
StartedCollege)
Characteristics Used HF K F HFH FHFH F HFH F
to Evaluate Eduation
andWage Equations:
EXP*a Slope _000b 1.9 1.7 2.1 8.1 8.6 7.6 8.6 8.8 8.4 7.7 8.1.7.4
—.00113.33.1 3.4 8.9 9.4 8.5 9.4 9.6 9.2 8.6 8.9 8.4
—.0056.6 6.5 6.8 11.2 11.6 10.9 11.6 11,7 11.5 11.0 11.2 10.8
a) HFPooled aa3pleofmen and women. K: Sample of men.F: Sampleof Women. The
education outcomes probabilities used in evaluating the internal rate to educationare
evaluated at the mean of theexplanatoryvariables for theindicatedsample. Results
usingthemean of theprobabilitiesevaluated over the distribution of the explanatory
variables are discuased in the text. The wage equations are evaluated at the sample
means. See the text for a description of the education and wage equations.
b. The EXps slope is the coefficient aon theproduct of years of academic education and
expertenc.. The wage equation was estimated with this parameter set to .000. .0011. and
.005respectively.The alternative estimates of the wage equation were used to evaluate
therat,of return.